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EXPROPRIATION OF ALIEN PROPERTY
Aliens seeking compensation for expropriation of their property by
foreign states today face difficulty not only in implementing whatever
remedies might be available but also and more fundamentally in securing
recognition by the expropriating state of the extent of the right to com-
pensation which they seek to enforce. Their problem is highlighted by the
unresolved debate between those who claim that the alien investor assumes
all the financial risks of seizure to which nationals are subjected and those
who contend that there may be no taking of alien property without payment
of full compensation. It is proposed in this Note to examine the validity
of these competing claims regarding the duty to compensate, the extent to
which compensation today may be said to be governed by a rule of law, and
the possibility of agreement on an internationally acceptable standard of
compensation.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
The Duty To Make Whole
The ninety years between 1836 and 1926 witnessed the establishment
of a rule of state responsibility in the expropriation of alien property; how-
ever, two distinct theories as to the extent of this responsibility emerged.
The first case to enunciate the traditional international standard of full
compensation involved British subjects dealing in sulphur in the Kingdom
of Sicily. A treaty, in addition to granting Britain most-favored-nation
treatment, had conferred upon British subjects the right to dispose of their
property without loss or hindrance. In 1836, however, the Sicilian gov-
ernment established a state monopoly in the sulphur industry.' The British
government protested through diplomatic channels and with a naval demon-
stration,2 thereby inducing Sicily to revoke the monopoly and to agree that
compensation for damages be paid to the aggrieved British sulphur
interests.3
Similar occurrences producing similar results 4 strengthened the full
compensation rule during the nineteenth century, and its vitality continued
1 See 28 BRIT. & FOR. STATE PAPERS 1163-242 (1894).
2 See Re, The Nationalization of Foreign Owted Property, 36 MINN. L. REv.
323, 337 (1952).
3 30 BIT. & FOR. STATE PAPERs 111 (1894).
4 In 1853 the property of an American citizen was taken by the Greek govern-
ment. 6 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 262 (1906). The United States
dispatched an emissary by warship to Athens to express the President's displeasure
and his desire that compensation measured "by recent sales of land in the vicinity"
be paid the claimant in order to end this "vexatious affair." Full compensation was
paid. Note From Secretary of State Everett to the American Minister to Turkey,
Feb. 5, 1853, in 6 MooRE, op. cit. vipra at 263-64. Four years earlier the British
(245)
246 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
into the twentieth, as is illustrated by a 1923 judgment of the American-
British claims tribunal.5 This case, producing perhaps the strongest
judicial statement in support of the duty-to-make-whole doctrine, arose
when the British claimed compensation for damage resulting from the
cutting by United States agents of the Hong Kong-Manila submarine tele-
graph cable during the War with Spain. Conceding the legality of the action,
the British government argued that many acts, legal in themselves, neverthe-
less may not be undertaken without giving rise to a duty to compensate.
Although agreeing with this argument, the court rejected the analogy
between cable cutting and expropriation, and denied the claim. Unlike the
wartime activity, said the court, a state's right to seize property is "not
absolute but limited, and is in reality only itself acquired in consideration
of the payment of compensation, and has no existence as a right apart from
the obligation to make compensation." 6
government had succeeded in diplomatic efforts to obtain compensation for a national
whose land had been taken by Greece as an addition to King Otho's garden. 39 BRIT.
& FOR. STATE PAPERS 410-82 (1894). And in 1889 the Delagoa Bay Railway was
seized by Portugal upon cancellation of an express concession agreement. The taking
was an outgrowth of a contractual disagreement between the Portuguese and the
American concessionaire constructor. See 2 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
1865-68 (1898). British financial interests were involved in the concession, and that
government, 81 BRIT. & FOR. STATE PAPERS 691 (1896), as well as the American
State Department, see 2 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1866-71 (1898), made
stern protests to the Portuguese who, after negotiation, agreed to the submission of
the question to arbitration. Although the arbitrators ultimately awarded satisfactory
compensation to the aliens involved, the question as to whether the compensation
should be paid was not left open for the tribunal's determination. The tribunal was
merely to fix the amount thought to be most just under the circumstances. 2 MOORE,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1874 (1898).
5 Eastern Extension, Australisia & China Tel. Co. (Great Britain v. United
States), American and British Claims Arbitration 73 (1923) (report of Fred K.
Nielsen). Another case evidencing twentieth century approval of the duty to make
whole was Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 7
(1926). The court, speaking of treaty provisions allowing expropriation of foreign
property without compensation, stated that such taking is "a derogation from the
rules generally applied in regard to the treatment of foreigners and the principle of
respect for vested rights." Id. at 22. However, the case itself turned on the narrow
question of whether the expropriation by the Polish government was in derogation
of the German-Polish Geneva Convention of 1922, article 6 of which stated that
"Poland may expropriate in Polish Upper Silesia . . . undertakings belonging to
the category of major industries including mineral deposits and rural estates. Except
as provided in these clauses, the property, rights and interests of German Nationals
may not be liquidated in Polish Upper Silesia." Id. at 21. Although holding
that the taking was in violation of the treaty, id. at 81, the tribunal, by the foregoing
dictum, gave insight into the attitude of the time regarding the broader question.
6 Eastern Extension, Australisia & China Tel. Co., supra note 5, at 76. The
quoted language necessitates consideration of a corollary of the full compensation
rule: that payment is a condition precedent to a valid taking. See Case Con-
cerning the Factory at Chorz6w, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 17, at 47 (1927) (taking in
violation of treaty provisions); 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 710-20 (2d rev. ed.
1945); Wortley, Expropriation in International Law, in 33 TRANSACT. GROT. Soc'y
25, 31 (1948); Wortley, Observations on the Public and Private International Law
Relating to Expropriation, 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 577, 591-92 (1956). This position
received its classic articulation from Secretary of State Hull: "[T]he right to
expropriate property is coupled with and conditioned on the obligation to make ade-
quate, effective and prompt compensation. The legality of an expropriation is in fact
dependent upon the observance of this requirement." Note From the Secretary of
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During the evolution of the full compensation rule, the narrower ques-
tion of its applicability to pervasive, nondiscriminatory seizures was pre-
sented on several occasions. The earliest expropriation which resulted in
full compensation, the Sicilian sulphur monopoly,7 involved a general
seizure of all sulphur mines. However, the authority of this incident is
limited in that payment was not the result of formal decision but rather of
diplomatic and military persuasion; thus the legal effects of the nature of
the expropriation did not receive judicial consideration. Judicial approval
of the application of the full compensation rule to general, nondiscrimina-
tory seizures is found in the Norwegian Shipowners' Claims," which arose
out of the United States Emergency Fleet Corporation's taking-under a
general scheme of ship requisition--of ships under construction for Nor-
wegian owners. The dispute was referred to arbitration under the terms
of a special agreement concluded and ratified by both countries in 1921.9
It is significant that the United States did not deny its duty under inter-
national law to render just compensation; thus the only controversy for the
tribunal's determination was the amount owing and the interest thereon.1 0
Even so, the tribunal felt constrained to point out that "no state can exercise
towards the citizens of another civilised State the 'power of eminent domain'
without respecting the property of such foreign citizens or without paying
just compensation as determined by an impartial tribunal, if necessary." 11
Such cases and others 12 indicate that nondiscriminatory seizures were con-
State to the Ambassador of Mexico, in 2 DEP'T STATE BULL. 380 (1940). Although
this view may have theoretical virtue, the better rule allows the taking state to decide
whether or not a right in property has been obtained, but leaves to international law
the determination of the state's liability for the acquisition. Lipstein, Conflict of
Laws Before International Tribunals, in 29 TRANSACT. GROT. Soc'y 51, 61 (1944).
Such a rule determines the alien's right to compensation without questioning-as does
the condition precedent theory-the legality of the seizure. See Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918) ; Luther v. James Sagor & Co., [1921] 3 K.B.
532, 548; FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 214 (1953). But cf.
RUBIN, PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT 50 (1956).
7 See notes 1-3 mupra and accompanying text.
8 (Norway v. United States), 1 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 307 (1922).
9 Agreement With Norway for the Submission to Arbitration of Certain Claims
of Norwegian Subjects, June 30, 1921, 42 Stat. 1925, T.S. No. 654.
10 Norwegian Shipowners' Claims (Norway v. United States), 1 U.N. Rep. Int'l
Arb. Awards 307, 313, 339-42 (1922). The amount owing was to be based on the
court's determination of the fair market value of the Norwegian property. Id. at 340.
3. Id. at 338.
12 Support for the traditional rule in instances of general taking may also be
found in the Portuguese position in Expropriated Religious Properties (Spain, United
Kingdom, and France v. Portugal), 1 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 7 (1920). This
case was the outgrowth of Portuguese confiscation in 1910 of all religious association
properties located within the state. The usual diplomatic protests followed on behalf
of the foreign-owned properties affected, and the government of Portugal agreed to
arbitration. The Compromis of Arbitration stated that the arbitrators were to "decide
the aforementioned claims in accordance with the conventional rights applicable
thereto, or that failing, according to the general provisions and principles of law and
equity." Id. at 9. This provision apparently gave the tribunal sufficient latitude to
decide whether compensation was owing upon expropriation of foreign-owned property;
however, the exercise of these powers to the full was found unnecessary: "It was
not the intention of the Governnent of the Portuguese Republic to seek in the seizure
1960]
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sidered within the zone of applicability of the full compensation rule. This
conclusion finds additional authority in language from the Hopkins Claim 13
of 1926. Hopkins had purchased postal money orders from the Mexican
authorities during the so-called "illegal" Huerta regime in Mexico; the
subsequent government of Carranza, however, attempted to nullify all such
interregnum obligations. The General Claims Commission held the
Mexican government liable inasmuch as its obligation arose out of a routine
governmental function-the sale of money orders-as opposed to a volun-
tary undertaking to supply a revolutionary government with arms and
munitions.'4 However, the decision obviously cannot be rested solely on
the principle of state continuity; 15 for even assuming state continuity, the
claimant could not have recovered unless the commission had recognized
a duty of compensation owing aliens-a duty generally repudiated by
municipal legislation. In answer to Mexico's contention that the claimant's
rights had been destroyed by the Mexican legislature's exercise of unilateral
sovereign power, the Commission stated:
[A] law by the Mexican Congress, could not possibly operate uni-
laterally to destroy an existing right vested in a foreign citizen or
foreign State . . . . [T]hat foreign citizens may enjoy both rights
and remedies against Mexico which its municipal laws withhold from
its own citizens is immaterial . . .. [I]t not infrequently happens
that under the rules of international law applied to controversies of an
international aspect a nation is required to accord to aliens broader
and more liberal treatment than it accords to its own citizens under
its municipal laws.16
The Principle of Equality As a Maximum
In addition to the principle of a duty to make full compensation to
aliens whose property had been expropriated, a second theory developed
based on the rule of equality: that such compensation as is decreed munic-
ipally is sufficient, provided aliens receive no less than nationals.
The case of Deutsche Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft Oil
Tankers 17 provides the most outspoken judicial language in support of the
of the said property a source of pecuniary gain." Id. at 12. This statement, when
coupled with the fact that Portugal defended her action on the ground that the
properties belonged not to the foreign claimants but to the religious associations
themselves, Fachiri, Expropriation and International Law, 6 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 159,
169 (1925), indicates that the question of a duty to compensate fully for a general
nondiscriminatory taking was not reached. The award of payment, a compromise,
see Williams, International Law and the Property of Aliens, 9 BRIT. YB. INT'L L.
1, 3 (1928), was given by consent of the parties. See Fachiri, supra at 169.
'3 Hopkins (United States v. Mexico), 4 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 41 (1926).
14 Id. at 42-46.
15 But see FRIEDmAN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 126.
16 Hopkins (United States v. Mexico), 4 U.N. Rep. Intl Arb. Awards 41, 46-47
(1926).
17 (Reparation Comm'n v. United States), 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 777
(1926).
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equality principle. The German government had confiscated certain
tankers owned by an American-controlled German subsidiary of Standard
Oil. At the end of the war, Standard Oil claimed that it was the beneficial
owner of the seized tankers and that therefore the ships should be returned
to it rather than included in the German cession-pursuant to a provision
of the Treaty ofVersailles 18 -of "German merchant ships." The tribunal
set up to adjudicate the claim held, first, that Standard Oil's sole-
shareholder relationship to its foreign subsidiary corporation did not con-
stitute it the legal, equitable, or beneficial owner of any of the subsidiary's
tangible property; second, that Standard Oil was not entitled to indemnity
inasmuch as the German seizure was a proper exercise of its power over
enemy controlled property; and third, that no claim to the tankers could be
founded on general equitable principles. In derogation of Standard Oil's
equitable claim, the tribunal stated that it is "a generally accepted principle,
[that] any person taking up residence or investing capital in a foreign
country must assume the concomitant risks and must submit, under res-
ervation of any measures of discrimination against him as a foreigner, to all
the laws of that country," 19 and that "the granting of compensation to the
Standard Oil Company cannot be justified, as against these companies
[other German shipping companies], by any consideration of equity." 2
0
If it is harsh to characterize-as did the Oil Tankers tribunal-foreign
investment as assumption of risk, equally arbitrary are the unstated prem-
ises of the full compensation rule: that the mere act of investment is prima
facie evidence that the investor has not been apprised of the possibility of
confiscation and that a confiscatory deprivation represents a breach of good
faith and a violation of the host state's legal duty.
2 1
The obvious applicability of the equality rule to a general, nondis-
criminatory taking is illustrated in practice by the action of the Italian
government in 1911.22 A bill was introduced in parliament which provided
for a state monopoly of the life insurance business, no compensation being
payable to the insurance companies, domestic or foreign. Protests and
claims for compensation were pressed by Austro-Hungary, England,
France, Germany, and the United States, all to no avail; 23 the bill became
law the following year.2
I8 Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, pt. VIII, annex III, para. 1, in 13 Am. J.
INTIL L. 151, 265 (Supp. 1919).
19Deutsche Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft Oil Tankers (Reparation
Comnm'n v. United States), 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 777, 794 (1926).
2 0 Id. at 795.
21 See 1 HYDE, INTERNATiONAL LAW 717 (2d rev. ed. 1945).
22 See FpIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 52-54; Williams, supra note 12, at 1-5.
2 3 Friedman points out that Uruguay, a weaker power whose congress passed
legislation of a similar character in the same year, was forced to back down in the
face of strong diplomatic protest.
2 4 However, perhaps by way of partial compensation, the insurance companies
were allowed a longer period than originally proposed in which to wind up their
business.
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THE DUTY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
In 1926
These precedents, termed "inconclusive" 25 and "not decisive," 26 have
been the source of much controversy among both publicists
2 7 and
diplomats. 28 Yet fairly taken, the nineteenth and early twentieth century
cases reflect the conviction of the time that a standard which enabled aliens
to survive acts of expropriation with full-or at least substantial---com-
pensation was or ought to be the rule. Such support in the abstract as the
principle of equality received might well have been withheld had the takings
occurred in the later settings of social upheaval where equality would lose
its protective character and become a ready means of avoiding the payment
of any compensation whatever. And dismissal of these precedents as
dictum by the opponents of the traditional standard merely emphasizes that
the arbitrating parties seldom questioned the existence of a duty to com-
pensate-an indication that such a duty had been accepted by states gen-
erally.29 Thus it would seem that the prevailing practice of demand for
and payment of full compensation to aliens whose property had been seized
had, in 1926, risen to the level of a rule of law-having satisfied the test
variously described as a "general assent of states," 30 "quasi unanimity," 31
and a usage "generally accepted as expressing principles of law." 32
The Rule of Law Challenged
However, the rule in its broad sweep was not long to go unchallenged.
In 1938 Mexico, which for some years had been engaged in general
programs of land redistribution, told the United States government that
"there is in international law no rule universally accepted in theory nor
carried out in practice, which makes obligatory the payment of immediate
compensation nor even of deferred compensation for expropriations of
general and impersonal character like those which Mexico has carried out
for the purpose of redistribution of the land . . . . 33 The Mexican
25 Brierly, Regles Generales du Droit de la Paix, 58 IECUEIL DES COURS 5, 170
(1936).
26 Williams, supra note 12, at 1-2, 14.
27 Compare Williams, supra note 12, at 2-15, with Fachiri, .upra note 12, at 163-69.
28 See the exchange of notes between Secretary of State Hull and the Mexican
government in the text accompanying notes 33-36 infra.
29 Cf. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, art. 38, in P.C.I.J.,
ser. D, No. 1, at 45 (1947) : "The Court . . . shall apply . . . (b) international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations . . . ." This international custom was con-
sidered firmly intrenched indeed in 1926: "With the acceptance by the community
of civilized nations of certain fundamental principles of law of which the inviolability
of private property is one, all such treaty stipulations [those protecting private
property] have become unnecessary" 34 INT'L L. Ass'N REP. 249 (1926).
30 Corbett, The Consent of States and the Sources of the Law of Nations, 6 BRIT.
YB. INT'L L. 20, 21 (1925).
81 Herz, Expropriation of Foreign Property, 35 Am. J. INT'L L. 243, 262 (1941).
82 Case of the S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 18 (1927).
33 Note of Aug. 3, 1938, 19 DEP'T STATE PREss 1EL.ASEs 50 (1938).
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government admitted a duty to compensate only "as determined by her
own laws."1 34
The United States Secretary of State, in reply to the Mexican note,
expressed his surprise at the proposition that "it is wholly justifiable to
deprive an individual of his rights if all other persons are equally deprived,
and if no victim is allowed to escape," and restated the traditional rule:
"No government is entitled to expropriate private property for whatever
purpose, without prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefor." 3 5
He concluded by remarking that the equality principle was a minimum
requirement and "wholly inapplicable to the issue." 38 A settlement was
ultimately reached in which Mexico agreed to pay, on a deferred basis, an
amount equal to the lost fiscal valuation prior to the expropriation."
The Rise of Partial Compensation
After the extensive nationalizations of capital assets in eastern Europe
following World War II, alien compensation was governed increasingly by
global settlements negotiated between interested governments and the
expropriating state38
A global settlement is likely to preclude the payment of full compen-
sation:39 it springs from the inadequate compensation originally offered
in the nationalization measure 40 and is not concerned with individual claims
-the claimant state parcels out the settlement payment to its own citizens
on a pro rata basis 41 In practice, such settlements have resulted in com-
34 Ibid.
35 Note of Aug. 22, 1938, 19 DEP'T STATE PRESS RELEASES 136 (1938).
36 Ibid.
3 7 This, of course, is not "full" or "adequate" compensation; to be considered as
such, the amount paid must reflect the full loss sustained by the owner in consequence
of the taking. See Hyde, Compensation for Expropriations, 33 AM. J. INT'IL L. 110
(1939). "Just compensation includes all elements of value that inhere in the property,
but it does not exceed market value fairly determined." Olson v. United States, 292
U.S. 246, 255 (1934). The recent Cuban land reform law provides that the tax value
be the base for determining payments. See N.Y. Times, June 12, 1959, p. 10, col. 2.
The United States has vigorously denied that such arbitrary valuation provides a
basis for just compensation. See Letter From Benedict M. English, Assistant Legal
Advisor, Department of State, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, July 8,
1959, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania. But see Snyder,
Measure of Compensation for Nationalization of Private Property, 3 CATHOLIC U.L.
Rxv. 107, 116 (1953), for an argument that if the tax return value of assets is not a
true one, the alien is merely paying for his past sins and omissions.
38 See, e.g., the settlements cited in notes 41-44 infra.
39 Cf. Kuhn, Nationalization of Foreign-Ozwned Property in its Impact on Inter-
national Law, 45 Am. J. INT'L L. 709, 710 (1951).4 0 E.g., the recent Yugoslav Building Nationalization Law which provides for
payment of approximately 1% of the value of the expropriated property over a fifty-
year period, both aliens and ationals to be treated alike. However, provision is
made for individual foreign governments wishing to negotiate settlements for the
property of their nationals affected. See Peselj, International Aspect of the Recent
Yugoslav Nationalization Law, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 428, 431 (1959).
41 See, e.g., United States-Yugoslav Claims Settlement, 19 DEP'T STATE BULL.
137-40 (1948). It would appear that in this instance neither government knew what
the total amount of the claims of United States citizens against Yugoslavia actually
was. Doman, Postwar Nationalization of Foreign Property in Europe, 48 CoLUM.
L. REv. 1125, 1151 (1948).
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pensation varying between estimates 42 of one-third 43 and two-thirds4 4
of the value of the property seized.
Disregard of the full compensation standard-while it may have
originated in new and underdeveloped states' defiance of international
norms 4 5-has in recent years attained a fair degree of respectability. At
the Conference of American States at Bogota in 1948, a proposal to amend
the Economic Agreement so as to sanction the rule of equality was narrowly
defeated by a ten-to-nine vote.46 Coolness toward the traditional rule has
also been evidenced in the United Nations. While passing a resolution
lauding state sovereignty and the inherent right of "peoples freely to use
and exploit their national wealth and resources . . . ," 47 the General
Assembly rejected 48 a United States amendment which provided that:
"Countries deciding to develop their natural wealth and resources should
refrain from taking action, contrary to the applicable principles of inter-
national law and practice and to the provisions of international agreements,
against the rights or interests of nationals of other Member States in the
enterprise, skills, capital, arts, or technology which they have supplied." 
49
Even the United States, a staunch advocate of full compensation, has been
forced reluctantly to accept the inevitable: it created the International
4 2 The amount actually paid in these settlements is often difficult to determine.
For instance, in the Yugoslav-British settlement of 1948, Yugoslavia agreed to pay a
sum unofficially estimated at one-half the British losses, but payment was contingent
upon the consummation of a favorable trade agreement. See FRIEDMAN, op. cit. snpra
note 6, at 46. Similarly, the British-Hungarian agreement of 1956 provided for pay-
ment of 14,050,000 as final settlement of British claims unofficially estimated at
£23,000,000; payment, however, was to be by yearly installments equal to 6.5% of
the F.O.B. value of Hungarian exports to the United Kingdom. See WORTLEY, Ex-
PROPRIATION IN PULIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (1959); Lauterpacht, The Con-
temporary Practice of the United Kingdom in the Field of International Law, 6 INT'L
& CoMp. L.Q. 126, 150-51 (1957). One commentator points out that the value of the
settlement bears little relation to the damage caused. FRIEDMAN, op. cit. spra note 6,
at 211.
43 British-Czechoslovaldan Agreement of 1949, see FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 42; Greek Land Reforms of 1952, see WORTLEY, op. cit. supra note 42, at 98;
Cuban Agrarian Land Reform Act of 1959, see N.Y. Times, June 12, 1959, p. 10, col. 2.
44 Belgian-Polish Settlement of 1948, see FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 38-39.
45The Mexican member of the International Law Commission, Mr. Padillo
Nervo, tacitly admitted that equality as a maximum had no sanction in traditional
international law when he stated: "The vast majority of new states had taken no
part in the creation of the many institutions of international law which were con-
solidated and systematized in the nineteenth century. . . . With state responsibility
. . . international rules were established not merely without reference to small
States but against them . . . . [I]t was perfectly natural for new States to be
reluctant to submit . . . [to rules] created to serve the purposes of their probable
opponents." 1 YB. INT'L L. COMM'N 155 (1957).
46 See Domke, Some Aspects of the Protection of American Property Interests
Abroad, 4 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 268-69 (1949); Re, supra note 2, at 340-41.
47U.N. Gen'l Ass. Res. No. 626 (VII), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Ric. 7th Sess.,
Supp. No. 20, at 18 (A/2361) (1952).
4 8U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 7th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 25, at 32
(A/2332) (1952).
49U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 7th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 25, at 7
(A/C.2/L.188) (1952).
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Claims Commission to parcel out to American claimants the undoubtedly
partial compensation resulting from en bloc settlements. 50
The overwhelming modern practice of states which make pervasive
expropriations of-alien property has been to pay compensation, 5' but in an
amount substantially less than the fair market value 52 of the property
affected. However, owing to the loyalty shown the old rule by its original
adherents, 53 partial compensation as yet lacks the degree of unanimity
necessary to supplant full compensation under the traditional principles
of international law.54
The Classical Theories in Today's World
Full Compensation
The majority view among publicists is that "the rule of international
law forbidding the expropriation without just compensation of private
property of aliens continues to be the positive international law." 55 This
position is based upon a view of international law which requires, as a
precondition to the application to aliens of the same system which a state
applies to its nationals, that the system meet a minimum standard of funda-
mental justice.56 Few are disposed to deny the existence and desirability
50 See Kuhn, supra note 39, at 710.
61 Even in cases of expropriations resulting from bitter class or national conflict,
the duty to pay aliens has always been admitted. E.g., Russia admitted liability of
9.6 million rubles for prerevolutionary bonds and capital investments held by foreign
interests. However, the Russian government insisted upon a set-off of 39 million
rubles representing the damages caused by the Western intervention of 1919-20. See
FIEMAN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 19-20. Similarly, Indonesia has recognized its
liability to Dutch investors whose property has been taken, the precondition for pay-
ment being the return by the Netherlands government of Western New Guinea. See
N.Y. Times, June 12, 1959, p. 10, col. 4.
52 See Delson, Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, Issues of Public and
Private International Law, 57 CoLum. L. Rnv. 755, 766 (1957); Re, supra note 2,
at 337.
53 In Western Europe, such nationalization as has transpired has been accom-
panied by full compensation related to market or stock exchange values. See Doman,
supra note 41, at 1141-43. However, since the amount of foreign investment in a
capital-exporting country is likely to be small in relation to its own holdings abroad,
such payment is likely to find its motivation in expediency rather than conviction.
54 See notes 30-32 supra.
55 See Kunz, The Mexican Expropriations, 17 N.Y.U.L. REv. 327, 344 (1940). See
also 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 876 (2d rev. ed. 1945); Fachiri, supra note 12,
at 171; Kaeckenbeeck, The Protection of Vested Rights in International Law, 17
BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 1, 16 (1936); Kissam & Leach, Sovereign Expropriation of
Property and Abrogation of Concession Contracts, 28 FoRDHAm L. REv. 177, 192-93
(1959).
56 This view was eloquently stated by Elihu Root in 1910: "There is a standard
of justice, very simple, very fundamental, and of such general acceptance by all
civilized countries as to form a part of the international law of the world. The
condition upon which any country is entitled to measure the justice due from it to
an alien by the justice which it accords to its own citizens is that its system of
law and admihistration shall conform to this general standard. If any country's system
of law and administration does not conform to that standard, although the people of
the country may be content or compelled to live under it, no other country can be
compelled to accept it as furnishing a satisfactory measure of treatment to its citizens."
4 PROCaws Nas A-m. SOC'Y INT'L L. 21 (1910).
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of some minimal international standard, save certain underdeveloped states
which fear-perhaps rightly-that it would be used as a weapon to inter-
vene in their affairs.57 Indeed, the traditional minimum standard may
clearly be called into play in extreme cases of injustice such as Walter
Fletcher Smith,"8 where, eight hours after a judicial decree 59 had awarded
preliminary possession of an alien's land to a governmental unit, the build-
ings were razed by a private organization which then used the property as
a place of amusement.60
Recognition of a minimum standard, however, is a matter quite differ-
ent from contending-as do the adherents of the traditional rule-that that
standard requires full compensation whenever there is interference with the
vested right of property. In the face of a dearth of supporting judicial
holding and confronted by nonconforming modern state practices, the
traditionalists' argument necessarily assumes a moral tone-that the right
to full compensation is sufficiently fundamental to be included within the
minimum standard of international justice.6 ' But believing the full com-
pensation rule to be conclusively established by precedents, its adherents
dismiss modern state practice on the ground that where settlement for
less than fair value has been accepted, it has been accepted ex gratia by the
creditors. 62  That any movement for change will be bitterly resisted is
evidenced by the fact that lack of enthusiasm for the traditional rule is
characterized as disregard of international law '3 and contrary practice is
labelled "unjust enrichment." 64 To stress, however, that military necessity
and social needs have replaced the storied inviolability of private property
with a "right that is only relative and conditioned more and more on the
needs of the community" 65 is but to belabor the obvious. 66 If international
law is not to be disastrously split into two opposing camps, 67 it appears
57 See FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 139 (1953).
5SDep't State Press Release, May 16, 1929 (United States v. Mexico), in 24
Am. J. INT'L L. 384 (1930).
59Municipal legislation cannot override a nation's obligation under international
law. See Free Zones of Upper Savoy, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 46, at 167 (1932).
Neither can a constitutional provision. See Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig,
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 44, at 24 (1932). To allow such obligations to be decided
unilaterally would be to deny international law's binding force. Cf. Wortley, Ob-
servations on the Public and Private International Law Relating to Expropriation,
5 Am. J. Comp. L. 577, 588 (1956).
60 See 24 Am. J. INT'L L. 384, 385-87 (1930).
61 Fachiri, International Law and the Property of Aliens, 10 BRIT. YB. INT'L L.
32, 49 (1929).
6 2 E.g., WORTLEY, op. cit. supra note 42, at 167.
63 See Cheng, Expropriation in International Law, 21 SOL. 98 (1954).
64 See Kissam & Leach, supra note 55, at 189.
65 FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 57, at 6.
66,,To ignore these contemporary attitudes and merely to re-iterate the maxims
of the past would simply be a species of self-deception." Speech by Oscar Schacter,
Director of the General Legal Division of the United Nations, Second Conference
on International Investment Law, Washington, D.C., Nov. 22, 1958, reproduced and
on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
67 See FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 57, at 206-07.
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imperative that its framework be capable of accommodating varying social
structures.6 8
Whatever the law may have been when the "civilized nations" 69-the
creators of the full compensation rule 70 -were in agreement on property's
inviolability, today the principle is merely a corollary of one socio-economic
system whose validity as a universal principle has been effectively rebutted
by the expressed attitude of many states of the modem world. Inalienable
rights may or may not be an affront to sovereignty-in the words of one
arbitral tribunal, "an unrestrained menace"; 71 those which relate to dis-
puted economic ideology can hardly fail to be. Insofar as the often impos-
sible duty to compensate fully stands between a nation and its accomplish-
ment of what it considers to be the social good, the doctrine is not acceptable
in this era of nonintervention and national self-determination. 72
Equality
The argument that the principle of equality determines the maximum
amount of compensation to be paid seems to be gaining supporters: some
writers 73 and many governments find it a convenient vehicle for expro-
priation as applied to aliens who-in common with nationals of the ex-
propriating state-receive little or no compensation. But those disposed
to show that no compensation need be paid for takings of a general character
also feel obligated to prove that no rule requires payment to aliens for any
type of taking.74 And having rationalized the complete absence of any duty
to compensate foreigners, they then backtrack sufficiently to exclude cases
in which aliens are subjected to an individual taking on the grounds that
"the considerations applicable are quite different," 75 or "such discrimina-
tion would rightly be regarded by the states of the foreigners affected as
an unfriendly act . ... 1 76 It may be, as suggested, that different con-
siderations should apply, but it is awkward to deny generally the inviola-
bility of the right of property as lacking the sanction of positive law, while
resurrecting it in specific contexts on policy grounds. Certainly foreign
states resent general confiscations no less than those of a specific character.
77
68 Cf. 1 YB. INT'L L. Comm'N 155 (1957).
69 Perhaps today it is more accurate to say "politically independent."
70 Cf. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, art. 38(c), in
P.C.I.J., ser. D, No. 1, at 21 (1947).
71 North Am. Dredging Co. (United States v. Mexico), 4 U.N. Rep. Int!l Arb.
Awards 26, 30 (1926).
72 See RuBIN, PRIVATE FoREIGN INVESTMENT 14-21 (1956).
73 See BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIOms 178 (2d ed. 1936); Dunn, International Law
and Private Property Rights, 28 COLUm. L. REV. 166, 180 (1928) ; Williams, Inter-
natio2al Law and the Property of Aliens, 9 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 1, 15 (1928); cf.
FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 57, at 206-11.
74 See FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 57, at 211; Williams, supra note 73, at 28.
75 FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 57, at 211.
7 6 Williams, supra note 73, at 28.
77 See, e.g., Note From Secretary of State Hull to the Mexican Ambassador to
the United States, Aug. 22, 1938, in 19 DEP'T STATE PRESS RELEASES 139 (1938).
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In any event, the doctrine of equality-in common with the standard
of full compensation-today lacks the nearly universal acceptance necessary
for its incorporation into international law. The ability of socialism and
other schemes for which expropriations are carried out to raise the living
standards of a country remains unproven in many minds; indeed, even
the namesake of the equality theory prophesies falsely in expropriation-for-
socialism cases: the dispossessed foreigners do not share in the disputed
benefits of socialistic change71s Some attempt has been made to explain
away the nearly universal practice of states to pay-or at least to admit a
duty to pay-something by way of compensation on the basis that such
payments are merely made ex gratia 79 "[in] mitigation of the frequently
considerable sacrifices demanded." 80 But neither the expropriating states
nor the aliens whose property has been taken are in the main philan-
thropists, and payment or receipt of an amount less than full compensation
is more readily explained in terms of a growing international practice
bred by necessity rather than by largesse.
THE SEARCH FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE STANDARD
Fachiri, writing in 1929, stated that if nations generally withdrew the
protection then accorded private property, the right of property could no
longer be termed "fundamental" and thus protected under international
law.81 Although he wisely abstains from characterizing the right of prop-
erty as fundamental per se, Fachiri's position seems to be that if quasi-
unanimity established the rule, quasi-unanimity is required to change it.
This prerequisite would permit a minority of states adhering to an outworn
rule to veto a change desired by the majority. Such a doctrine of prior
in time, prior in right has little justification in the formulation of inter-
national law in these quickly changing times. To remain in force, any
particular rule must maintain a continuing quasi-unanimity; 82 it cannot
rely merely on the historical fact that it once commanded the adherence of
states generally. To hold otherwise in the instance of the rule of full
compensation ignores the views of many established states of the world
and forces new underdeveloped nations to enter the world arena subject to
a rule that not only ignores them but actively discriminates against them.
8 3
It would thus appear that the once acceptable rule of law is open to
serious question today with regard to extensive nondiscriminatory takings.
7834 PROCEEDINGS Am. BRANcH INT'L L. Ass'N 67 (1958).
70The use of a similar argument has been noted in the case of creditors. See
text accompanying note 62 supra.
8 0 FRmDmAN, op. cit. supra note 57, at 210-11.
81 See Fachiri, supra note 61, at 50.
82 However, it should not be possible for a few states who have once assented
to the rule to invalidate it by occasional contrary practice. Cf. Williams, supra
note 73, at 3.
83 See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
EXPROPRIATION OF ALIEN PROPERTY
And inasmuch as the pressure for the rule's change very likely originated
with the obstacles to social reform presented by the requirement of pay-
ment in full,8 4 its application to large-scale discriminatory or special
seizures is equally dubious.8 5 To the smaller special takings resulting from
the day-by-day use of the power of eminent domain, the pragmatic con-
siderations which have undermined the full compensation rule do not apply;
thus, it is not surprising that, as to such expropriations, there is no sub-
stantial dissent from the traditional rule.86 As to payment in other than
the eminent domain cases, however, there is quasi-unanimity only on the
proposition that some compensation should be paid. No general agreement
exists as to the quantum of the payment.
87
The exact quantum of compensation which international law will
ultimately regard as a.n acceptable rule cannot as yet be predicted. Certainly
factors such as ability to pay 8 8 and the availability of foreign exchange 89
will be influential. It is also possible that some underdeveloped states may
be persuaded-in order to attract sorely needed foreign capital 9 0-to
84 See Delson, supra note 52, at 765-66.
85 E.g., in the special taking of British oil interests in Mexico, the government
paid compensation estimated to equal only a third of the fair market value of the
property expropriated. Schwartzenberger, The Protection of British Property Abroad,
in 5 CURRENT LEa. PROBLEMS 295, 306 (1952). Also in this category of taking are
the very recent seizures of virtually all property owned by American concerns in
Cuba. It is as yet too early to determine what the amount of compensation will be.
However, at the present time it seems doubtful that any substantial payment will be
made under the plan of reimbursement announced by the Cuban government. Premier
Fidel Castro, whose expropriation decree was an expected retaliation for the cut by
the United States of the quota for Cuban sugar, has stated that "compensation" will
be made by issuing fifty-year bonds, payable from revenues derived from Cuban sugar
sales to the United States in excess of three million tons sold at 5.4 cents a pound
annually. Sunday Bulletin (Philadelphia), Aug. 7, 1960, § 1, p. 1, col. 8.
8 6 Delson, supra note 52, at 764.
8 7 
Cf. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 352 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955).
88 Cf. United States-Yugoslav Claims Settlement, 19 STATE DFP'T BUL.. 137
(1948), in which $17,000,000, an amount equalling 42.5% of the "amount originally
claimed" was extracted from Yugoslavia, the Yugoslavs having $47,000,000 in gold
on deposit in the United States. See Rubin, Nationalization and Compensation: A
Comparative Approach, 17 U. CHI. L. REv. 458, 463-65 (1950). See also RUBIN,
op. cit. stipra note 72, at 50. But cf. Kissam & Leach, supra note 55, at 189.
89 Of the currency problem, it has been said, "between the concession that the
compensation, even if in local currency, must be something more than merely formal
compensation and the contention that lack of foreign exchange resources does not
limit the power to nationalize or expropriate lies an area almost wholly undefined."
Rubin, supra note 88, at 462. Perhaps trade agreements are an answer to the diffi-
culties arising when an expropriating state lacks sufficient foreign exchange to pay
usable compensation. Cf. Fawcett, Some Foreign Effects of Nationalization of Prop-
erty, 27 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 355, 374-75 (1950). No treaty of the United States
requires that sufficient foreign exchange be available to the expropriating state in
order to pay compensation at the time of the taking. RUBIN, op. cit. supra note 72,
at 78.
9 0 It has been estimated that the underdeveloped nations of the world (not in-
cluding oil producers) were able to generate only 7.5 billion dollars of capital in
1957. Of the additional 15.2 billions that would be required to raise their annual
incomes 4% per person, only 4.9 billions were forthcoming. PARLIAMENTARY GROUP
FOR WoRLD GOVERNMENT, A WORLD INVESTMENT CONVENTION? 22-23 (1959).
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guarantee that no expropriations will be made except upon the payment
of full compensation. In this vein, the United States has been able to
negotiate with a few countries 91 treaties providing for prompt payment "in
an effectively realizable form and [which] shall represent the full equivalent
of the property taken . .. . .92 That this method of insuring full com-
pensation has not enjoyed greater success probably arises from the unwil-
lingness of many states-due to their conception of future economic
necessity-to limit themselves in this regard.9 ,
The ideal solution, of course, would be a uniform international rule-
a necessarily compromised multilateral treaty acceptable, on the one hand,
to the investor and his capital-exporting state and, on the other, to the
underdeveloped nations. Perhaps because the interests of the Western
lending nations are more immediately concerned-involving primarily the
protection of property already in existence-most proposals for such a con-
vention have emanated from those countries and, as a result, have taken as
their point of departure the full compensation rule. Some drafts, such as
that of the Invisible Transactions Committee of the Office of European
Economic Cooperation, seem to do no more than restate it: "just and effec-
tive compensation . . . which shall represent the genuine value of the
property affected . . . in transferrable form . . . paid without undue
delay." 94 Similarly, the Havana Charter provided that "no member shall
take unreasonable or unjustifiable action within its territory injurious to
the rights or interests of nationals of other member countries in the enter-
prise, skills, capital, arts or technology which they have supplied." 95 But
apart from these bland restatements, there are also certain recent innova-
tive approaches worthy of consideration.
The Harvard Law School Draft
Although not abandoning the proposition that just compensation be
paid aggrieved aliens, the Harvard Law School draft 98 attempts to render
this rule more palatable to expropriating states by making several con-
cessions. First, it abandons the doctrine that the taking must be for a
9 1 See 26 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 881 (1952).
92 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation With Japan, April 2, 1953,
art. 6, para. 3, 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2069, T.I.A.S. No. 2863, at 2063.
93 There are also unfortunate political connotations of capitulation associated
with bilateral treaties. See Speech by Mr. Oscar Schachter, supra note 66.
94 DRAFT CONVENTION ON INVESTMENTS ABROAD art. III at 4 (1959) (submitted
by West Germany to the Organization of European Economic Cooperation, April
1959).
95 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT, HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION art. 11(1) (b), at 9 (1948), in Wicox, A
CHART FOR WORLD TRADE 227, 235-36 (1949).
9 0 HARVARD UNIVERSITY LAW ScHooL, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE CONVENTION
ON THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Harvard Draft].
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"public purpose," 97 the only limitation on the expropriation being that it
must be "under the authority of the State." 98 Second, it disavows the
application to takings of the terms "lawful" and "unlawful." This dis-
avowal indicates the draftsmen's recognition that restitution as a remedy is
impracticable; the alien is to have compensation as his sole remedy.99
Third, the draft permits, in cases of general economic and social reform,0 0
the payment of the compensation required (fair market value) 101 over a
period of years, provided that bonds bearing a reasonable rate of interest 
102
are given and that prompt payment is made of a reasonable portion of that
which is owing.10 3 The reasonable interest and partial payment conditions
are designed to "protect those aliens of limited wealth who might other-
wise be left destitute"; 104 and the provision as a whole indicates an aware-
ness that the very circumstances of general expropriation make it impossible
to pay full and immediate compensation. 1 5 Fourth, as to aliens who have
resided in the taking state for a considerable period, the draft permits the
expropriating state to make payment in its own currency 106 on the theory
that such aliens have thrown their economic lot in with the state of their
residence.
107
Should these concessions seem shadowy and somewhat short of true
compromise, it must be pointed out that a code containing a substantial,
enunciated retreat from the full compensation rule would not be acceptable
to the capital-exporting states.'08
The International Law Commission Draft
In his second report to the International Law Commission, Mr. F. V.
Garcia Amador advocated the following rule for governing the expropria-
tion of alien property: "The State is responsible for the injuries caused to
an alien by the expropriation of his property, save in so far as the measure
97 Id. at 66. The actual existence of such a doctrine is dubious at best as inter-
national law does not contain ifs own definition of public utility, FRI MAx, op. cit.
supra note 57, at 141, and it would seem most inappropriate to pass on the methods
and social objectives of states. As was said in the Shufeldt Claim (United States v.
Guatemala), 2 U.N. Rep. Intl Arb. Awards 1081, 1095 (1930): "Reasons are no
concern of this Tribunal." See also Oscar Chinn, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 63, at 64,
79 (1934). See generally FRIEDMAN, Op. cit. supra note 57, at 140-44. But see Walter
Fletcher Smith (United States v. Cuba), in 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 384 (1930); Kissam
& Leach, supra note 55, at 190.
98 Harvard Draft, art. 10, para. 1, at 64.
99 Harvard Draft, explanatory note at 66; cf. note 6 supra.
100 Harvard Draft, art. 10, para. 2, at 64.
101 Harvard Draft, art. 10, para. 1(b), at 64.
102 Harvard Draft, art. 10, para. 2(c), at 64.
103 Harvard Draft, art. 10, para. 2(b), at 64.
104 Harvard Draft, explanatory note at 69.
105 Harvard Draft, explanatory note at 68.
106 Harvard Draft, art. 39, para. 2, at 150.
107 Harvard Draft, explanatory note at 152-53.
108 Cf. PARLIAMENTARY GROUP FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT, op. cit. supra note 90,
at 15, para. 55.
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in question is justified on grounds of public interest and the alien receives
adequate compensation." 10 9 In his commentary, which shares the am-
biguity of the authorities relied upon,110 Mr. Amador apparently concludes
that property may be expropriated in the public interest, that the question
of compensation is one properly decided municipally, and that the compen-
sation paid the alien, unless discriminatory, is a matter of international
concern only if the expropriating state fails to conform to the minimum
standard of civilized societies.
111
As one might expect, the public interest qualification was attacked on
the one hand as unduly restrictive 12 and on the other as too vague to
prevent taking motivated by "political considerations." "13 And apparently
the members of the Commission believed the prescribed adequate compensa-
tion to be the traditional minimum standard of full compensation, for the
proposal was both criticized 114 and applauded 115 on that basis. However,
the citation in the reporter's commentary of diametrically opposed author-
ities with seemingly equal approval 16 would tend to leave the quantum of
the minimum open to question.
The arbitrary minimum standard approach does not appear to be a
workable reformulation of the rule of compensation. If given traditional
meaning, the rule would be obviously unacceptable to underdeveloped
states; and if it is to connote the modern practice of states, few potential
investors would find reassurance in the certainty of partial compensation
at best. Neither of these formulations provides an acceptable basis of
compromise.
The Rome Conference Proposal
The feasibility of a new point of departure in the reformulation of the
rule is illustrated by the proceedings of the recent Rome Conference on
International and Comparative Law. The conference, sponsored by
UNESCO, was attended by representatives of nearly all the Western
capital-exporting powers as well as by those of India, Lebanon, the Soviet
Union, and three other Communist countries. 117 On the question of
nationalization of foreign property, agreement was reached, with only a
single dissent," 8 on the proposition that "foreigners should be entitled to
109 2 YB. INT'L L. COM'N 104, 117 (1957). See also Amador, State Responsi-
bility, 2 YB. INT'L L. COMM'N 1, 16-24 (1960).
110 Compare Williams, supra note 73, at 28, and Kaeckenbeeck, La Protection
Internationale des droits acquis, 59 HAGUE RECUEI. 321, 412 (1937), with Fachiri,
6 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 159, 171 (1925).
" 2 YB. INT'L L. Comh'x 104, 120-21 (1957).
112 1 YB. INT'L L. Comm'N 158 (1957).
113Id. at 165.
114 Id. at 158.
115 Id. at 165.
116 See note 110 supra.
117 7 INT L & Comp. L.Q. 585 (1958).
118 That of Czechoslavalda, id. at 587.
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claim equal treatment with nationals . . . [and] in any case entitled to
compensation, but whether such compensation should be full, or 'just,' or
simply some compensation, was to be treated as a question of fact in each
ca. ." 119
This formulation provides an excellent basis for an international
agreement among the states of the world. As a part of that agreement, a
new tribunal ' 20-unfettered by past pronouncements on the subject-could
be set up to arbitrate disputes arising over the amount of compensation to
be paid. Inasmuch as states are unwilling to accept general restrictions on
their power to expropriate and aliens equally unwilling to accept as a pre-
determined certainty less than substantial compensation, it does not seem ad-
visable or even possible to attempt to secure agreement on the factors, other
than those of a most general nature, which should influence the arbitrators'
determination. And any such factors which are enunciated should not fore-
close the alien's equitable arguments relating to the good faith of the taking
or the possibility of using the future profits of his enterprise as deferred
compensation, or prevent him from showing an implied undertaking by the
state when he entered the country not to expropriate his property. To the
underdeveloped states such an ad hoc, judgemade law should offer assurance
that their socio-economic aims will be considered "less in relation to some
abstract standard of truth than as a means of expressing widely-felt human
needs." 121
Attention should be directed toward the formulation in each case of a
standard mutually acceptable to the parties concerned. Certainly the at-
tempts to produce finely drawn agreements covering a multitude of possible
cases have thus far reached no tangible results--or even theoretical accord.
Perhaps the agreement reached at Rome indicates an underlying desire to
compromise through an expeditious retreat from the slogans and extreme
ideological positions of the past-an attitude worth, in the words of Mr.
Justice Holmes, "a hundred citations to Grotius."
A.B.M.
319 Id. at 586-87.
120 Cf. PA.LIAMxENTARY GROUP FOR WoRLD GOVERNmENT, op. cit. supra note 90,
at 14.
12 1 Statement of Mr. Radhabinod Pal, Indian member of the International Law
Committee in 1 Y. INT'L L. Comz'N 158 (1957).
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